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Kenya’s Constitution and Institutional Reforms 
after Political Violence 1991-2010
Akoko Akech
Introduction
The involvement of the International Criminal Court in Kenya’s 
political crisis, after the 2007-8 political violence, perhaps is the most 
discussed of the four main reform agenda undertaken to redress 
the immediate and remote causes of political violence that has 
rocked Kenya since 1991. However, the involvement of the ICC in 
Kenya’s political affairs, arguably, is only remarkable to the extent 
that it has either stymied or enabled Kenya to undertake difficult 
constitutional and institutional reforms. Indeed, it hard to tell what 
type of political reforms Kenya’s nationally organized groups 
would have achieved with or without the international pressure, 
including but not limited to the credible threat of ICC prosecution 
of Kenyan elite.
This policy brief looks at what the cyclical political violence, 
which characterized Kenya’s transition from one-party and 
presidential political contests, has produced: the deaths, the patterns 
of violence, the beneficiaries of the violence, ways of seeing Kenyan 
politics, political fears, and more importantly the constitutional, 
institutional and policy responses to these crises. 
Despite Kenya’s remarkable constitutional and institutional 
reforms, it seems that the new political institutions and processes 
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seems to be hardening ethnic identity, or valorizing ethnic 
identification, contrary to the objectives of the Constitution of 
Kenya 2010 that seeks to promote social pluralism. It also seems 
to produce two intertwined political consciousness, at once ethnic-
conscious and rights-conscious citizenry. Poignantly, ethnic-
centric analysis of Kenya’s social question seemed to elide equally 
important social cleavages of the Kenyan society: gender, age, race, 
class and religion.     
Political Violence, Multi-Partyism and Democratization
The official reports, namely the Parliamentary Select Committee 
to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other parts of Kenya (the 
Kiliku Report, 1992), the Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed 
to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (the Akiwumi Report, 2002), 
the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence(the Waki Report, 
2008)  notes that:
The first wave of violence, 1991-1998, targeted mostly those from 
ethnic groups perceived to supporters of opposition pressure groups 
and parties, particularly Forum for the Restoration of Democracy. 
It was widely experienced in the former white highland (settlement 
schemes) located along the borders of the Rift Valley Province, and 
at the Coast Province in 1997. Although the claim of land injustices 
by the Kalenjin and the Maasai was invoked as the reason for the 
violence, the violence was largely directed against peasants, small-
holder farms in the Rift Valley. 
Notably, those in the Daniel Arap Moi regime who were directing 
the violence did not target the large land holding by Kenyan elites 
and the Multi-National Companies, who sit on vast lands, whose 
ownership is even more contestable than a significant number 
of small holder farms bought off the land markets, sometimes 
by controversial land buying companies. Nor did they direct 
the violence against the controversial beach plots, owned by the 
Kenyan elite, along the Indian Ocean coastline in the then Kenya’s 
Coast Province.
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Neither Ethnic Violence nor Land Clashes
Thus the violence was political, to the extent that it was largely 
directed against the non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai ethnic groups 
living in the then Rift Valley province, namely, the Kikuyu, Kisii, 
Luo, the Luhya, the Bukusu, and the Teso, or ‘wabara’ (those from 
hinterlands of the Kenyan Coast) at the then Coast Province. 
Additionally, it was land related, to the extent that it only targeted 
the smallholder peasants or urban dweller and peasants at the 
Coast, whose electoral choice was viewed as threat to the ruling 
party’s presidential, Kenya African National Union, grip on state 
power in the competitive elections of 1992 and 1997.  
The existent media reports and the official reports suggest that 
the first wave of violence was perpetrated by people whose real 
identity remains largely unknown, with the complicity of the Moi 
government. The identity of the ‘Kalenjin warriors’ widely reported 
to have committed the violence remains a mystery. However, the 
Moi regime in general, and the Kalenjin, especially the leaders who 
have built a career out of ethnic fear-mongering, and the peasants 
who use the lands of those displaced by violence, are the prime 
beneficiaries of these cycle of violence. 
The numbers of those killed, raped, maimed and displaced by 
the first wave of violence are contestable. The most widely cited 
numbers on those killed is the Africa Rights Watch or the Human 
Rights Watch 1993 Report: Divide and Rule. Although the report 
explains how it arrived at the displaced as 300,000, the report does 
not explain how it arrives at the 1,500 killed. Moreover, those who 
cite the Human Rights Watch numbers often take no notice of the 
fact that the violence and the killings continued well after the date 
of the publication of the report. The report was mostly concern with 
present land claims, not the past land claims, arguably, the basis of 
current contentious politics. 
Moreover, the Human Rights Watch Report in its tacit 
endorsement of sedentary agrarian preferences demonstrates a bias 
6
P o l i c y  B r i e f  N o . 2, o c t o B e r  2015





Makerere Institute of Social Research
  
. .  
: + - - -  | + - - -  | + - - -  (  )
: director@misr.mak.ac.ug | : http://misr.mak.ac.ug
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY
POLICY BRIEF NO.1, OCTOBER 2015
Beyond Nuremberg: Learning from 
the Post-Apartheid Transition in 
South Africa





Makerere Institute of Social Research
  
. .  
: + - - -  | + - - -  | + - - -  (  )
: director@misr.mak.ac.ug | : http://misr.mak.ac.ug
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY
POLICY BRIEF NO.1, OCTOBER 2015
Beyond Nuremberg: Learning from 
the Post-Apartheid Transition in 
South Africa
against the Kalenjin in particular and the pastoralist in general. It 
also relies on very thin evidence from Njehu Gatabaki’s Finance, 
whose anti-Kalenjin bias is well documented, to make a strong 
claim that Kalenjin politicians owned an army believed to have 
committed the violence. However, the extant media reportage 
during this period bears out the fact that well-organized gangs 
committed the violence; however, there is no sufficient evidence that 
categorically identifies the ‘warriors’ as Kalenjin. The only evidence 
that links the warriors to the Kalenjin is the affidavit of a Valentine 
Kodipo, but Kodipo, the only known self-confessed member of 
this ‘Kalenjin warriors’, makes claims are largely uncorroborated 
and circumstantial, certainly by the truth regime of liberal rights 
discourses.  
The official report, namely the Akiwumi report, does not present 
the numbers of those killed, maimed, raped and displaced. The 
commission cross-examined only mid level police and government 
officers and the victims of violence. The report noted the acts of 
omission and commission of government officers, the involvement 
of police officers, aided the warriors who killed, maimed and burnt 
houses. However, its explanation of the violence as something 
driven by culture, tradition, cattle rustling, ethnic resentment and 
hatred, downplays the significance of the Moi regime’s involvement 
as the principal financier and directors of the violence. 
The recommended only the prosecution of mid to low level 
government officers and ministers. Although the Akiwumi Report 
concluded that the violence was political, it offered a cultural 
explanation for the violence. It only recommended a limited reform 
of the Provincial Administration and prosecution of those believed 
to have sponsored the violence or whose acts of omission or 
commission aided and abetted the violence. However, in 2002, the 
High Court of Kenya declared the report a nullity, after finding, on 
its own, that Report had been presented to the President after the 
expiry of the Commission’s mandate.   
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The systemic attacks on the ethnic groups perceived to be 
supporting opposition parties and the accompanying political 
rhetoric of the KANU and opposition politicians raised the level 
of ethnic consciousness to a new high. Inter-ethnic group relations 
in the Rift Valley were increasingly characterized by tension, 
suspicion and low trust. The politics and the violence united the 
Kalenjin elite, who turned an emerging Kalenjin inter-class struggle 
over land into an intra-peasant violence along the ethnic cleavage. 
While the human rights groups and Church-based organizations 
rose to defend the victims of violence by invoking human rights, 
other ethnic association such as the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association 
(GEMA) or politicians also rose to defend their co-ethnic living in 
the Rift Valley. Kenya witnessed the rise of political militia groups, 
both in the urban and rural areas, notably: the Bhagdad Boys, 
Mungiki, Jeshi la Mzee, among others.    
The Second Wave
The official report on the second wave of violence, 2007-2008, 
the Waki Report meticulously documented the numbers of those 
killed, maimed, raped and displaced by the violence occasioned by 
the disputed presidential elections. However, it mostly relied on 
official police and hospital records, and records of humanitarian 
non-governmental organizations. Kenyans, notably, those from the 
regions, which perceived the Kibaki government as hostile to their 
interests, did not participate in the Commission’s deliberations.
The Waki Report found that the second wave of violence was 
spontaneous in some areas and planned in others. The Rift Valley 
experienced both. The planned violence, one believed to have been 
planned by the Kalenjin elite and the other by the Kikuyu elite, from 
the State House in Nairobi and a private members club in Nairobi. 
Both used militias to execute the violence, however, the Kikuyu 
elite directed militias (the Mungiki) were aided by a complicit 
police force in the crime committed against Orange Democratic 
Movements supporters in Nakuru and Naivasha.
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The report noted that the police and the militia groups accounted 
for most of the killings. The police was found to have partisan 
and the least prepared of the forces, in the run up to the general 
election. Unlike the previous wave of violence committed by the 
so-called warriors, this wave largely set neighbor against neighbor, 
government installation and business enterprises. Rift Valley 
Province registered the highest number of those killed (744), 
followed by Nyanza (134), Nairobi (125), Western (98), Coast (27), 
and Central (5). In total 1,133 people were killed, with the Kenya 
Police killings accounting for 35.7 percent or 405 deaths, however, 
the majority of killings being citizen on citizen murders. Sexual 
violence such as sodomy, gang rape, forced circumcision and 
mutilation of the penis were also recorded, especially in the Rift 
Valley and slums of Nairobi.  
The report noted that the second wave of violence was more 
widespread: it affected several provinces, rural and urban areas, 
especially the slum of Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu. The report 
was categorical that the violence was political. It recommended 
thorough reforms of the Police force, notably, placing nearly all 
the major armed formations under the command of the Inspector 
General of Police. Notably, it recommended that those believed 
to bear the greatest responsibility for the violence be prosecuted 
through a special tribunal or by the International Criminal Court. 
Dual Political Consciousness 
The political contestations defined by these two waves of 
violence have produced two types of political consciousness: rights 
consciousness and ethnic consciousness. Arguably, the struggle 
for a liberal democratic order, and sometimes social democratic 
order, championed the mostly by lawyers’ led non-governmental, 
professional associations, and social movements has produced  a 
right conscious  citizenry whose rallying call in public protests 
often is ‘haki yetu,’(our rights). Conversely, the struggle to retain or 
seize state power, at any cost, has also produced politicians and a 
9
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citizenry that is conscious of their ethnic identity, whose mobilizing 
ideology is ethnicity,  and make political claim based on real or 
imagined claims of indigenity, marginalization, and historical 
injustice. The rallying call of this group is often ‘watu wetu’ (‘our 
people’) are being or have been marginalized, or ‘are being finished.’ 
This politics is driven by the fear of losing privileged access to state 
resources, use of state power to keep advantages, and the fear of 
losing out to other elites in political competitions. 
These two strands of politics run parallel to each other, albeit in 
a double helix like formation.  There are critical nodes when ethnic 
interest is articulated as liberal rights and liberal rights discourse is 
articulated in defense of ‘ethnic’ rights. These debates are not only 
invoked in the struggle for land, but also over who has the right 
to occupy a public office, and whether or not a particular ethnic 
group has its far share of public jobs, given the most recent census 
demographic figures.  
What Kenyans Fear
Poignantly, during this period, the arguments for political 
transition and democracy, reveals that Kenyans have not redressed 
the founding fears of Kenya as a unitary state, a common political 
entity for three regions the British ruled as geographically distinct: 
namely, the Kenya Colony and Protectorate, the Sultanate and the 
North Frontier Districts. The Kenya state, arguably, was founded 
on the basis of three profound fears, and subjectivities wrought by 
settler colonialism state craft of divide and rule. These fears have 
not only shaped how Kenyans organize socially, but also how 
Kenya’s constitution and institutions have been designed.
 At the Lancaster House Constitutional Talks three profound 
fears were: fear of racial discrimination and domination, fear of 
ethnic discrimination and domination, and fear of centralized 
state power, especially its use to champion either racial or ethnic 
discrimination or domination. Given the fact that Lancaster House 
10
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Constitutional Talks were male dominated, one can add that fear 
of male domination to this list and the fear of rule by old men, 
gerontocracy, wrought by Mwai Kibaki’s preferences for appointing 
‘retirees,’ when youth unemployment remains high and Kenya had 
a youth bulge.  
Epistemic Blind Spots of Ethnic Lenses
 A reading of the major reports on the political violence suggests 
that many analysts of Kenya politics mostly look at Kenya through 
ethnic lenses. However, the use of ethnicity as the most salient social 
cleavage to evaluate presidential candidates, appointment to ‘the 
commanding heights’ of state-bureaucracy, the allocation of funds 
and  to assess the (un) fairness of a regime often mask other salient 
cleavages, which also define Kenya’s politics. It wrongly represents 
Kenya as mono-cleavage society, whose challenges to diversity 
and inclusion would be redressed if Kenya became an ethnically 
inclusive society. Using ethnic lens often elide other equally 
significant social cleavages: class, age, race, gender, ideological, 
and religious of Kenyan society.  
Constitution and Policy Interventions
In 2010, Kenya enacted a constitution as a comprehensive 
response to the political crisis wrought by the multiparty political 
competition. Notably the constitution attempt to redress the 
excesses of  majoritarianism in Kenya’s politics: through devolution 
of state power, provision on regional equity on resource allocation 
and appointment to public office, and the establishment of the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission  to redress ethnic 
and racial discrimination. 
Although the Constitution of Kenya 2010 created 47 Counties, 
the inability of Kenya political elite to agree on an alternative 
electoral systems and the political realignment occasioned by 
the emergence of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto’s political 
rapprochement led to a political compromise on the nearly colonial 
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district boundaries for the County government has done little to 
redress the problematic ethnic logic of Kenya’s politics. Most of the 
administrative boundaries of the devolved government are based 
more or less on the 1962 District boundaries. In 1962, 35 out of 41 
Districts had one dominant ethnic group; an absolute majority of 
the population, in 17 Districts over 90 percent was of the same 
ethnicity. 
Although key locations within the Rift Valley and the Coast 
had experienced significant demographic shifts, ethnic dominance 
remains a key characteristics of most the new County governments. 
There is a high risks of County government will reproduce the 
politics of exclusion and marginalization, given ethnic dominance 
and majoritarian voting patterns.  In Counties, such Narok, and 
Kajiado County, where Maasai are demographically outnumbered 
by other ethnic groups, risk producing a double sense of loss: 
loss of land and chance to lead at the national and local levels of 
government. 
Kenya’s majoritarian democracy seems to be at odds with the 
general constitutional quest for political inclusivity. Consequently, 
the current electoral system is bound to generate conflicts between 
groups that claim indigeneity in particular counties, and have 
legitimate claims of being marginalized, but have a limited chance 
of winning in majoritarian electoral competition, where ethnic 
consciousness run deep.  
Constitution and Diversity
Legally, ethnicity is something that the Constitution of Kenya has 
not defined.  The preamble of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 states 
that ‘ethnic, cultural and religious diversity’ is something Kenyans 
are proud of. However, it mostly uses several proxies such as 
‘regional balance,’ diversity of language, culture, and communities 
to refer to ethnicity. The National Cohesion and Integration 
C mission is the Constitution of Kenya 2010’s answers to the 
ethnic, gender, age, religious and race questions in Kenya. 
12
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Despite having the official mandate to do all that appertains 
to ethnic and racial discrimination, the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission has a nebulous definition of ethnicity. The 
Act does not even attempt to define race or racial relations.  The 
Act of Parliament that establishes this Commission defines ethnic 
group as ‘a group of person defined by reference to color, race, religion, or 
ethnic or national origins,’ and that  ‘reference to a person’s ethnic group 
refers to any ethnic group to which a person belongs,’ on the one hand. 
On other hand, ‘ethnic relations’ include ‘racial, religious, tribal and 
cultural interactions between various communities, and the word ethnic 
and ethnicity shall be construed accordingly.’1 Its powers include the 
power to recommendation prosecution of those accused of ethnic 
discrimination in employment or allocation of national resource, 
and hate speech. Its duties, includes, conciliating warring groups, 
‘name those whose words or conduct undermine good ethnic 
relations’ and educate Kenyans peaceful co-existence in diversity.
However, the Commission’s critique point out that prosecution 
of individuals who air views considered ethnic hate speech is 
counterproductive and a waste of public resources. They argue 
that what is at stake here is the issue of rights and the place of free 
speech in Kenyan society. Therefore, imposing stiff penal sanctions 
cannot work in situation where ethnic prejudice is so perverse and 
offender too many. Instead, the Commission should expose those 
who trade in ethnic slur and prejudice as wrong and simple minded. 
Moreover, the Commission and the media should educate Kenyans 
about the ethnic prejudices Kenyan comedians and politician 
purvey; this would yield better outcome, argues the critics of the 
Commission. However, would naming and shaming those who 
hold prejudice against others really brings social pressure to bear 
on the accused?
1 Republic of Kenya, National Cohesion and Integration Act no.12 of 2008 (Revised in 
2012). Nairobi: Government Printer.
13
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NCIC Ethnic Representation in Public Sector Reports
The law mandates NCIC to ensure that: ‘All public establishments 
shall seek to represent the diversity of the people of Kenya in the 
employment of staff’ and that ‘No public establishment shall have 
more than one third of its stuff from the same ethnic community.’ 
However, the commission’s legal mandate is mostly or only concern 
with ethnic diversity in public service, Kenya’s private sector is 
perceived to be no different. 
Moreover, the private sector and the public sector are independent, 
and arguably, ought to be judged by one set of morality, especially 
where government is the biggest consumer of whatever the private 
sector consumes. Arguably, acts of ethnic discrimination within the 
private sector are just as consequential as the acts of discrimination 
within public service. What aspects of ethnic relations can public 
policy regulate or ought to regulate? When and why was the 
practice of listing and prominently displaying the names of all key 
government officials outside the main offices discontinued?  
Whereas the Commission’s periodic reports on the ethnic 
composition of Kenya’s public reports the percentage of ethnic 
groups in public employment vis-à-vis the most recent census 
demographic findings (2009) it is not clear how the Commission 
operationalizes the concept of ethnicity and translates it into 
statistics, given the nebulous legal definition referred to earlier. 
The census process allows for self-identification as a member of an 
ethnic group, however, how does the Commission determine one’s 
ethnicity in its reports? How would one tell someone’s ethnicity? 
Can it be done from ones’ ‘race, color, religion ethnic or national origin? 
Does the commission do a head count and a self-identification 
exercise to determine who belong to which ethnic group? Or does 
the Commission infer these identities from the middle, surname 
or both of civil servants from a master-pay roll of all government 
employees? If so, how significant is the likely error of omission and 
inclusion of people with frequently occurring cross-ethnic names, 
women who take up their husbands names, Muslim names, and the 
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‘ghost workers created by top-bureaucrats? How do these errors 
of omission and commission impact on the overall figures said to 
represent ethnic domination in government?
Individual Merit or Historical Injustices
The proponents of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 argue that 
Article 10 and 232 of the constitution has fundamentally altered the 
matrix of factors to be considered when making public appointment 
or allocation public resources. They argue that ethnicity, disability, 
gender and age should be taken into account, besides merits. 
However, critics of those demanding ethnic diversity within the 
public service are ‘regional balancing of employment opportunity,’ 
works against individual merit. It also contravenes the 
Constitution’s Bill of right, which categorically states that no one 
should be discriminated against, on the account of ethnicity, among 
other grounds. What is just in this context? How fair is the use of 
imputed ethnic identities in making public appointments? Should 
advertisement for public jobs individualize the responsibility of 
ensuring ethnic diversity, by stating expressly those who need not 
apply for the job? Or state expressly only those who should apply 
for the job? What is the purpose of civil service in Kenya today?
The critics of the Constitution argue for an ethnic-blind (merit only) 
allocation of public employment opportunities, but the proponent of 
the Constitution argue for an ethnic-sighted appointment to public 
office(sensitivity to past historical disadvantages). The proponents 
of the diversity articles of the constitution cite a history of exclusion 
and marginalization based on ethnicity, as something that must be 
taken into account, and that the new Kenya polity aims at diversity 
and unity as the ultimate goals to be maximized by in allocating 
public offices and state resources. What is fairness according to the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010?
Lastly, whereas the Commission is said to be independent, it is 
independent only to the extent that it determines its activities once 
parliament has allocated it funds. The Commission dependents on 
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the good will of the parliament, by extension the government, who 
decides how much resources it is allocated to perform its duties. 
Yet parliamentarians and the incumbent government always top 
its list of offenders, at any given moment. How effectively can the 
Commission fulfill its mission under such conditions?
Media Reportage
The audit reports of Kenya’s Civil Service such as the 2008 
Report, which give statistics such as ‘five of the main ethnic groups: 
Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luyia, Kamba and Luo account for 70 percent of 
all civil service jobs. Of all the workers, 22.3 percent are Kikuyu, 
16.7 per cent are Kalenjin, followed by Luyia (11.3 percent), 
Kamba (9.7percent), Luo (9.0percent) and Gusii (6.8 percent),’ are 
newsworthy, but has the media asked the Commission to explain 
is methodology: how the Commission conceptualizes ethnicity and 
account for all probable errors of omission and inclusion? How has 
the media reported these statistics? 
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Recommendation
Kenya’s current electoral system is incongruent with it’s the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010’s aim of producing a socially plural 
society; Kenyan need think about an electoral system that can 
guarantee diverse representation without falling into an ethnic trap 
of reifying the present social identities and cleavages.
Kenyan need to debate and then ask Parliament to urgently enact 
the law that operationalizes the Article 232 (3) of the Constitution 
of Kenya 2010 in order to effect the values and principles of fairness 
in public service appointments envisaged by the drafter of the 
constitution. Both public and private sector should be bound by the 
same morality. 
The NCIC should rethink it ethnic reports on the composition 
of governments. It should clearly state how it assess the degrees 
of ethnic dominance in public offices, not just provide statics 
without explanations on it operationalises and quantifies the legal 
definition of ethnicity or race. The report seems to encourage 
ethnic identification and provides a perverse incentive for ethnic 
extremist. It seems to organize the Kenya society against itself, not 
against the pillage by political elites.
The Kenya media needs to be critical of the NCIC reports, avoid 
sensational reportage, and ask tough methodological questions.
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